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1 I ntroduction 
Background and purpose of the code 
I. I This code of guidance on fire precautions i n  town centre develop� 
ment and redevelopment schemes was prepared by a working party 
appointed by the Joint Fire Prevention Committee of the Central 
Fire Brigades Advisory Councils for England and Wales and for 
Scotland. The working party comprised representatives of Govern­
ment Departments and of the Fire Service; a list of its members is 
in  Appendix A. The object of the working party was to lay down 
principles for the guidance of those concerned with fire prevention 
arrangements in town centre development and redevelopment 
schemes. Because schemes of this nature vary so greatly, it  is not 
possible to make detailed recommendations which will be applicable 
in all circumstances. Where detailed recommendations can be made, 
they are included; in general, however, it  will be necessary for the 
reader to interpret in  individual situations the application of the 
main principles which this code of guidance attempts to set down . 
1.2 The working party expressed the wish that the code should be 
used as guidance not only by the fire service, for whom it was 
primarily prepared, but also by local authorities, architects and 
others concerned with the design and development of these schemes. 
Compliance with the code cannot, of course, confer exemption from 
statutory requirements. but it is intended to indicate alternatives 
which might be acceptable where strict compliance with statutory 
requirements is  impracticable, or incompatible with the general 
design concepts. 
1.3 The code contains among its proposals recommendations which 
authorities may be expected to take account of when considering the 
application or relaxation or enforcement, as the case may bc, of 
Building Regulations or statutes such as the Offices, Shops and 
Railway Premises Act 1963. Some of these recommendations are 
concerned with fundamental matters such as the design and con· 
struction of town centre development areas, and developers are 
therefore strongly recommended to discuss their ideas jointly with 
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the building authority, the Ore authority and the Department of the 
Environment or the Scottish Development Department at a very 
early stage, in order to avoid the need for costly and perhaps incon­
venient changes in their plans. 
Scope of the guidance 
1.4 The guidance is concerned primarily with that type of develop­
ment and redevelopment scheme which can be termed a 'complex' 
and this term has been used commonly in the code for the sake of 
brevity. The term 'complex' may be taken to mean a multi-level, 
multi-occupancy development sometimes of considerable extent, 
perhaps including existing buildings or streets and incorporating 
some undivided areas of considerable extent. Normally the type of 
problem concerned will be confined to complexes consisting of more 
than one level and many types of occupany; a single storey 
pedestrian precinct will usually be capable of being dealt with accord­
ing to conventional principles and is therefore not specifically dealt 
with in the code. However, some of the principles in the code may be 
useful where such a development is roofed over. It may be difficult, 
moreover, to identify a complex as a separate entity since develop­
ments will undoubtedly emerge in the future which will consist of a 
succession of limited complexcs, without clearly defined boundaries. 
1 .5 Another point which should be borne in mind as regards the 
scope of the guidance is that it concerns itself primarily with the 
fire prevention aspects of complexes. While it is accepted that fire 
prevention and fire-fighting problems are frequently difficult to isolate 
from each other, and it is arguable ihat the greatest problems in 
town centre developments may be fire-fighting ones, the working 
party was limited by its terms of reference to dealing with fire preven­
tion. Since, moreover, the fire-fighting problems of complexes arise 
out of the nature and disposition of the constituent parts of the 
complex, it appears to be a logical step to give attention to the 
principles which.govern the arrangement and layout of complexes 
before turning attention to the fire-fighting problems which arise 
therefrom. 
1.6 Finally, the working party has been concerned with rather differ­
ent considerations and hazards than those of which the current 
Building Regulations in England and Wales and, to some extent, 
those applicable to Scotland, take account. The Building Regulations 
in England and Wales are directed to the health and safety of the 
public; those of Scotland are concerned with the safety, health and 
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convenience of people in a building and the safety of the public. The 
working party believed that its concern was more specific and that it 
should relate to the prevention of fire, restricting the spread of fire 
and means of escape from fire, and this approach has therefore been 
adopted. 
3 
2 Safeguards against fire spread 
General principles 
2.1 It is important to realise thal, while it is necessary to restrict the 
spread offire with the object of reducing the amount of damage, there 
arc deeper and perhaps more important objectives. Onc of these is 
concerned with the fact that a fire which is allowed to spread beyond 
a certain extent in the early stages may well become uncontrollable: it 
may, in other words, present such difficulties because of its size that 
there is little prospect of its ever being brought under control. This 
could result in a conflagration in which the property loss was liable 
to be very serious indeed. Another objective of preventing or retard­
ing fire spread relntes to means of escape: although this is dealt with 
later in part 3 of the code, it may be said at this point that the basis of 
all provision for means of escape involves arranging the evacuation 
of a given part of a premises within a shorter period of time than that 
which smoke and fire will take to spread into that part of the premises 
and constitute a danger to the occupants. It follows, therefore, that 
the extent of the area through which a fire can spread unchecked in a 
relatively short space of time has a vital bearing on the possibilities 
of providing adequate means of escape. 
2.2 It can be seen from these arguments that there is a relationship, 
however difficult it may be to express in quantitative terms, between 
the safety of a complex as a whole from tbe effects of fire, tbe danger 
of life which may result from fire to the occupants of a complex and 
the extent of undivided areas witbin the complex. Indeed one of the 
principal reasons for the existence of the working party was to 
attempt to find a balance between, on tbe one hand, tbe needs of 
sound commercial practice, which requires the largest possible 
undivided spaces and, on tbe other, the need to avoid the possibility 
of an uncontrollable fire situation or an impossible evacuation task 
arising in a complex. 
2.3 A complex, if it were built entirely in accordance with Building 
Regulations, would incorporate reasonable safeguards against these 


















the safety of the public although, except in Scotland, the Regulations 
do not at present control the means of escape. Among the most 
important of these safeguards is compartmentation-the separation 
or division of a building into firetight cells in order to contain a fire 
within the compartment of origin. Relaxation of any particular 
regulation is considered where there are reasons to believe that this 
will involve no material risk, for example where other forms of 
safeguard are incorporated into the complex so as to achieve a stan­
dard of safety equal to that called for in the regulations. In particular 
cases, a more stringent standard may be recommended i n  this code 
and, i n  such a case, the reasons for the higher standard will be noted. 
204 These safeguards are dealt with in detail in the following para­
graphs. By way of introduction, it should be explained that they are 
of 3 kinds, viz: 
a. those structural features which are applicable to the development . 
as a whole, and 
b. those constituting compartmentation and the sub-division of 
compartments, respectively. By the former is meant the creation, 
by means of compartment walls and floors in accordance with 
the regulations, of separate 'cells', each capable of containing a 
fire for a specified time. By 'sub-division' is meant an arrangement 
of interior walls, partitions, doors, ete, within a compartment so 
as to retard growth of fire within the compartment, and 
c. except as provided in paragraph 2.7 complete sprinkler protec­
tion throughout the complex . 
Structural features of the complex as a whole 
2.5 The following should be incorporated into complexes of the type 
envisaged in paragraph lA above: 
a. Non-combustible construction 
All structural elements of the complex and non-Ioadbearing 
walls around shops should be built of steel encased in concrete, 
reinforced concrete, masonry or brickwork (as appropriate). 
b. Fire resistance 
i. The structural elements and walls referred to in the previous 
paragraphs should have fire resistance normally of 2 hours 
but in certain circumstances up to 4 hours. In general, the 
higher fire resistance within this range would only be necessary 
for extensive storage compartments, for basements or for 
situations in which basement conditions are approximated. In 
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,ome purpo,e groups (in Scolland, occupancy groups) of low 
lirc load it may be possiblc to reduce thc fire resistance 
requirement to below 2 hours, though never below onc. (Sce 
sub-paragraph iii. below.) In achieving this fire resistance, it is 
recommended that hollow coverings or casings in the form of 
a membrane should nol be used to increase the fire resistance 
of structural clcments which do not inhcrently possess the 
required fire resistance. It is considcred that the risk of 
mechanical damage makcs it desirable that fire-resisting con­
struction be solid throughout. (This should not, however, 
prevent thc usc of hollow blocks or of solid bricks or blocks 
with a cavity between the brick or blockwork and the struc­
tural member.) It is also recommended that suspended ceilings 
which arc intended to contribute to the fire resistance of a 
compartment floor above should not be included in the design 
of a complex. 
ii. The fire resistance of any element of structure should not be 
less than that required for any element whicb it supports. 
iii. The implications have been considered of providing a lower 
/ire resistance in one part of a complex which may be expected 
to have a lower fire load tban the remainder, subject to its 
being separated from the rest of the complex by compartment 
walls and floors and that tbe principles of sub-paragraph ii. 
above are met. While there migbt be dangers in this procedure 
if, at some later date, a cbange of occupancy group or purpose 
group of that part of the complex took place, and involved tbe 
use of that part for a higber lire load, this danger is not 
considered to be severe and may be disregarded. However, it 
it is important that information as to the purpose group or the 
occupancy group of all areas of the complex should be avail­
able at the planning stage; when this information is not avail­
able, the fire resistance sbould not be reduced below 2 hours. 
c, Boundary separation 
At the outer boundaries of the complex itself there sbould be 
either a separating wall or sufficient separating space between the 
complex and neighbouring property to ensure tbat fire spread 
cannot occur in either direction. Compliance with the appropriate 
regulations will ensure that adequate separation exists. 
d. Even distribution of lire risk and load 
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It is desirable that compartments wiihin a complex should show a 
general consistency of fire risk and fire load throughout the com­













load, a separate compartment should be ereated for this area, 
which should be fully compartmented (by compartment walls 
and/or floors) from the remainder of the complex. By 
'abnormally' is meant a degree of fire risk or fire load markedly 
above the average of the remainder of the complex. 
c. Full horizontal compartmentalion 
It is preferable that floors in a complex should be constructed as 
compartment floors. Where this is impracticable, some com­
pensatory provision should be included to preserve the effect of 
compartmentation. 
f. Compartmentalion of different purpose groups 
Parts of a complex which fall into different purpose groups 
should be fully compartmented one from the other. Moreover, 
where large units of purpose groups other than shops are to be 
placed on the same storey of a complex, they also should be fully . 
compartmented: for example, if it is proposed to place a theatre 
and a cinema and/or some similar unit such as a bowling alley on 
the same storey of a complex there should be full compart­
mentation between each. 
Compartmentation of shopping aroas 
2.6 a. The effect of sprinklers on compartment size 
The Building Regulations provide that, where sprinklers are 
installed, compartment sizes in shops at least may be larger, but 
still not infinitely large. The assumption behind this provision has 
firm origins in past history. The working party examined it care­
fully and, while they found it somewhat confusing, they were 
reluctant to attempt to put forward any alternative theory. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that, if a sprinkler system functions as it is 
intended, any fire originating in the sprinklered compartment 
should, theoretically, be controlled. This being so, it can be 
argued, the size of the sprinklered compartment could safely be 
infinite. However, there are certain factors which can, exception­
ally J operate to interfere with the successful control of fire by a 
sprinkler system: one of them is a failure of the system to operate 
at all, and another is a failure of the sprinkler water to reach the 
fire effectively because of obstructions of one kind or another. 
These factors result in a diminished certainty of control by the 
sprinkler system, but to attach a quantitative value of this reduc­
tion of certainty is clearly impossible. The best compromise that 
has been suggested is that a sprinklered compartment is at least 
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twice aR safe HR an ul11ipl'inklcJ'cd onc of thc same size, and to 
adjust requirements accordingly. Whatever may be the short­
coming of this viewpoint, it has been accepted for purposes of 
this code of guidance. 
b. Compartment size in spJ'inklcred parts of complexes 
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i .  The current Duilding Regulations in England and Wales and 
in Seolland permit shop compartments to measure 14000 m' 
if sprinklers arc filled. It follows that in a single shop, no part 
of the floor area should exceed approximately 3 700 m2 
(regarded in this context as equivalent to 14000 m') and a 
compartment of this size should be fully compartmented from 
any other part of the shop. As for areas which consist of more 
than onc shop (wltich we regard as being 'sub divided') no 
restriction on the total area is considered necessary if the 
following rules are adopted: 
1 .  Not less than 60 per cent of the total area (excluding shops 
fully compartmented as i n  the previous paragraph) should 
consist of units (ie separate sbops) not exceeding 280 m2, 
each of which is enclosed as described in sub-paragraph 2 
below or of the associated closed maJls or open pedestrian 
ways. 
2. The smaJl shops referred to above should be enclosed on 3 
sides by walls having fire resistance equal to the full eom­
partmentation referred to earlier as applicable to tbe 
3 700 m2 area. The frontage on to a covered mall or open 
pedestrian footpath will constitute tbe fourth side and 
shops on a corner site will not require a third enclosing 
wall. 
3. The remaining area may consist of shops larger than 
280 m2 but smaller than 2 800 m2 subject to the provisions 
in sub-paragraphs ii. and iii. below. 
ii. A particular danger of extensive fire spread arises wben large 
undivided units of area are placed opposite to one another, for 
instance with any part of their open sides facing across a mall 
or pedestrian footpath. It is considered unsafe for areas 
exceeding 2000 m2 to face one another in this way, unless 
both frontages are protected by automatically operated steel 
shutters giving at least one hour's fire resistance, or by 'back­
up' walls, ie compartment walls of the same fire resistance 
behind the shop window display areas. Steel shutters should 
not be permitted to interfere with the means of escape. (See 





iii. Similarly, if areas of this size adjoin one another with their 
open sides in the same plane, there is a risk of fire spreading 
from one large space to the next round the intervening wall. 
Such areas (ie those exceeding 2000 m') sbould be protected 
by back-up walls behind the shop windows for a distance of at 
least 3 m on both sides of tbe intervening wall or be separated 
from each other by at least one small shopping unit not morc 
tban 280 m' in area. 
c. Sprinklers sbould extend throughout an occupancy group. 
Sprinkler protection 
2.7 As has been indicated, the foregoing recommendations arc made 
on the basis that sprinkler protection will be provided throughout the 
complex in general. Exceptions to this should not be made in shop­
ping areas, but the general rule does not preclude the omission of 
sprinklers in certain circumstances, as follows: 
a. where, in a compartment or space completely separated from its 
surroundings, some form of extinguishing system other than 
sprinklers is more appropriate, viz: a computer room, trans­
former chambers; 
b. Where in a separate compartment as above (:l.n automatic detection 
system is morc appropriate than an extinguishing system, viz: a 
public museum or a picture gallery; 
c. where, exceptionally, a compartment is again fully separated and 
does not, because of its nature, merit such protection, viz: a car 
parking area with substantially open sides giving a high degree of 
continuous ventilation. 
d. where a small complex which aggregates not more than 2 800 m2 
consists of not fewer than 5 shops . 
Other factors to be considered 
2.8 The foregoing are the general principles which are recommended 
for determining the sizes and arrangements orthe various units which 
may be incorporated in the shopping area of a complex. Certain other 
features of such areas are dealt with in the following paragraphs. 
Smol<e venting 
2.9 It will be clear that everything that has been said in the foregoing 
paragraphs about the risk of fire spread wilhin a storey of a complex 
is much aITected by the provision that can be made for the removal of 
the products of fire in the form of hot gas and smoke. It must be 
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acccptcd that the recommendations arc conditional upon adequate 
provision of this kind being made; the amount of this provision, and 
the menns by which it may be made arc considered in part 7 of this 
codo. 
The effect of mall width 
2.10 In considering a plan of a shopping area in a complex, it is 
obvious that there will be many occasions when shop units face each 
other across a pedestrian mall or footpath. Preceding paragraphs 
have pointed to some of the ways in which the risk of fire spread 
should be reduced in the circumstancesl but it remains true that, 
particularly as regards tbe smaller areas, these will present a risk of 
early fire spread from tbe unit on one side of a mall to that facing it 
on the other side. This risk is much affected by the width of the mall, 
and this, in turn, will be affected by whether the mall is open to the 
air or roofed over. The danger of rapid fire spread across a covered 
mall is greater than is tbe case with an open mall, and of course the 
material effect upon means of escape is more serious in the case of the 
covered mall because of the tendency of the roof to cause hot gas and 
smoke to collect. It is therefore recommended tbat, witbout prejudice 
to any effect tbat means of escape requirements may have upon the 
width of malls (see paragraph 3.15), covered malls should not in 
normal circumstances afford a widtb of less tban 6 m from shop 
window to sbop window and that open malls should not afford a 
widtb of less tban 5 m between sbop fronts. 
Fire�resisting shutters 
2.11 Reference was made in paragraph2.6b.ii. above to a condition in 
which 2 large sbopping areas faced eacb other across a mall, and in 
which it was recommended that automatically operated fire-resisting 
shutters be provided across shop fronts as a means of avoiding the 
risk of fire spread across the mall. For the purpose of tbe Building 
. Regulations, fire-resisting shutters constitute full compartmentation, 
ie they have the same value for purposes of compartmentation as a 
fire-resisting wall. Attention is drawn, however, to the fact tbat 
fire-resisting shutters have only been tested under BS 476 'Fire tests 
on building materials and structures' up to certain dimensions; in 
excess of a certain width or height for example, it is not possible to be 
certain that such a shutter will behave precisely in accordance with 
the tested sample. J n addition, of course, single shutters do not pro­
vide insulation against the transmission of heat as a wall does. It is 














I area, nor more than 4m in any direction. Double shutters are recommended to ensure adequate insulation where compartmenta­
tion is required. Sensing devices should be placed both inside and 
outside every shutter position. From shops which are provided with 
�hntters there must be alternative escape routes. 
Fire-resisting glazing 
2.12 In the circumstances described in paragraph 2.11 above, the 
question may arise of the effectiveness, for fire separation purposes, 
of fire-resisting glazing. It is possible, of course, for glazing, when 
installed in suitable frames, to provide fire resistance of up to one 
hour; however, this will have shortcomings as regards fire separation 
in 2 ways. Firstly, while fire-resisting glazing will remain in position 
and will resist penetration for the specified time, it nevertheless 
permits the passage of radiatcd heat and can thus lead to fire develop­
ing on the other side of the glazing under certain circumstances. ' 
Secondly. and for the same reaSOD, it can present some danger to 
life when it acts as the separation between a fire and persons making 
their escape. For both these reasons, some limitations need to be 
imposed on the use of fireMresisting glazing in complexes as elsewhere, 
and for details of these limitations the reader is referred to British 
Standard Code of Practice No 152: 1966 'Glazing and fixing of glass 
for buildings'. Glazing is not permitted in compartment walls. 
The value of drenchers 
2.13 The use of drenchers has been considered as a means of pro­
viding compartmentation when shop frontages in a complex face 
cach other. While not denying the value that drenchers may have in 
appropriate circumstances, it is not considered that they are suitable 
for providing thc kind of protection called for between shopping 
areas in a complex. The principal reason for this is that a drencher 
system is cssentially a means of keeping wet (and therefore cool) a 
vertical surface which is exposed to heat radiation. Many shop 
frontages in complexes have no shop windows, and a drencher system 
would not therefore be valid. Even when glass windows exist, reliance 
cannot be placed on a drencher system to kcep thcse intact in the 
face of radiated hcat from opposing shop frontages only a few feet 
away. 
Automatic fire detection systems 
2.14 Reference was made in the preceding paragraphs to the 
reduction in risk which occurs in shopping areas when sprinklers are 
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fitted. The question will arise in many minds as to whether a com­
parable reduction in risk can occur if an automatic fire detection 
system is provided and is connected directly to a fire brigade terminal 
point or an approved signaJling station. In certain circumstances 
these detection systems may have great value but at the same time 
their function is not comparable with that of a sprinkler system, 
since the controJling effect of the latter upon a fire is direct and 
automatic. The provision of a fire detection system, however valuable 
in itself, cannot therefore justify relaxations from established 
standards of compartment sizes, etc in the particular context of 
complexes. More detailed consideration is given to the question of 
automatic fire detection in later paragraphs of this code. 
Trade refuse 
2.15 Cases will occur, particularly in large multi-level complexes, 
where facilities for the collection and removal of trade refuse have 
to be provided in close proximity to the shops in the malls. An 
acceptable solution is to provide large removable containers at 
service road level and ducts or chutes from the upper levels which 
will deliver the refuse direct into the containers. If so, the whole 
system should be contained withln a protected shaft with adequate 
smoke extraction arrangements at high level direct to open air. Fire 
suppression systems should be extended to cover such shafts. 
Unified ownership 
2.16 The effectiveness of the measures outlined in these paragraphs 
for controJling the spread of fire in a complex is liable to be affected 
by the degree to which unified ownership applies in a complex. Many 
. of· these measures require inspection, maintenance and the co­
operation of occupiers to ensure that they remain effective, and this 
in turn requires control and authority to be exercised from a single 
responsible body. This may well apply equally or more strongly to 
measUres dealt with in other aspects of this guidance. The basis of 
control over the sizes and disposition of spaces etc whlch has been 
put forward should therefore be used only in cases where, due to 
unified ownership or other circumstance, a firni degree of discipline 
can be expected throughout the complex as regards fire precautions 
generally . 
. . ,. 
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3 Means of escape from fire 
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3.1 As was pointed out in paragraph 2.1' above, the basis for all 
provision for means of escape involves arranging the evacuation of a 
given part of a premises within a shorter period of time than that 
, . 
'which smoke and fire will take to spread into that partof the premises 
and constitute a danger to the' occupants: Three elements are thus 
needed to secure the safety of the occupants, 'viz design' features in 
the premises to retard the spread of smoke and fire; a warning 
system; and adequate physical means of egress from the premises to 
match the number and physical ability oLthe occupants. The first of 
these 3 elements was dealt With in part 2, the second is dealt with in 
part 4 of the code and the third is considered in the following 
paragraphs. 
General principle 
3.2 The basic principle to be observed in providing means of escape 
from any building is that persons should be able to turn their backs 
on any fire or smoke which may be present in any compartment or 
section of a building and reach a place ot safety by their own unaided 
efforts without being affected. This may be applied to complexes by 
the provision of adequate well-placed exits fromfioor 'areas and if 
necessary sufficient well-sited protected' staircases, ' within eac;h 
occupancy unit; of pedestrian walkways ,
'
or malls cif sufficient width 
and height to afford safe, comfortable transit through the' complex 
away from the affected area; and of facilities su<;h as ramps, stair­
cases, ,or other means, to enable persons to des�eAd' or 'a'scend, if 
necessary from walkways o'r malls, to a diffenmt level. 
,', . 
Place of safety 
, ' 
. 
. . .  . "  - . 
3.3 Reference was made above to a 'place of safety'. This is the 
accepted phrase used, in connectiort with means of escape from 
single buildings, to denote the destination towards which the escape 
routes from a, particular building are directed. Once that point is 
reached, the safety of the occupants is no longer deemed to be the 
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responsibility of those concerned with the building from which 
escape has been made. For this reason, a place of safety in the 
context of single buildings is normally a public street or open space. 
3.4 In a complex, this concept must be differently regarded. In tbis 
case, the whole complex corresponds to the building, and the 
responsibility of the planners of means of escape continues, theoreti­
cally at least, until the boundaries of the complex arc reached. 
Escape routes must be planned to allow continuous safe movement 
away from the affected area for an unspecified distance, so that 
people may ultimately be free of all danger from fire. In practice, the 
occupants of the complex will only need to move sufficiently far from 
the locality of the fire to ensure their comfort and safety, and how far 
this is, will either be self-evident at tbe time of an incident or be tbe 
subject of announcements at tbe time by responsible officials. For 
this reason among otbers some form of public address system may 
well be desirable, but more is said on tbis subject in part 4 of tbe code. 
Escape from individual occupancies 
3.5 In Scotland, means of escape are prescribed by ibe Building 
Standards (Scotland) (Consolidation) Regulations 1971 and 'escape 
routes or exits terminate at a 'place of safety' whicb is defined as 
either an unenclosed space in tbe open air at ground level or an 
cnclosed space in the open air at ground level whicb bas a means of 
access to such an unenclosed space by means of an exit or exits 
having a width or aggregate width not less than the widtb or aggre­
gate widtb of tbe exits leading from tbe building to the enclosed 
space. In England and Wales however the majority of occupancies 
within a town centre development will fall within tbe uses set out in 
British Standard Code of Practice CP 3: Chapter IV: Part 2 (1968) 
'Shops and Departmental Stores' and Part 3 (I 968)"'Oflice Buildings', 
and it is recommended that tbese 2 documents should be consulted 
for details of planning and design of escape routes within these typ.e. 
of occupancy; similarly, Part 1 'Flats and Maisonnettes (in'blodes 
over two storeys)' should be consulted wbere this is appropriate: . "In 
all these documents, escape is divided into 3 stages, the last of which 
always terminates at the final exit point from the building. The 
recommendations on means of escape in this code may be taken as 
applying from that point onwards, with
' 
only the following proviso. 
3.6 In planning escape routes from single buildings, it is normally 
necessary to provide alternative routes in case one route is - o�stn.icted 







although separate, terminating at adjacent points although not at the 
same final exit. For instance, 2 routes may debouch from the 
building through adjacent doors into the same street. In a complex, 
however, tWs area is liable to be enclosed by a roof or closely con­
fined between neighbouring structures, and could thus be an unsafe 
area. It is important therefore in a complex that alternative escape 
routes should discharge occupants at points in malls, walkways or 
concourses distant from each other: such points should be separated 
from each other by a physical barrier capable of holding back heat 
and smoke. A case in point is where 2 alternative final exits from one 
occupancy are situated on different compartment floors; in this case, 
if one final exit is affected by fire, the other will be a safe area 
because of the intervening compartment floor. This arrangement has 
the additional benefit of allowing one route for access by firemen 
while the other is being used for the escape of occupants. 
3.7 Additionally, as will be seen later from part 7 of tWs code the 
amount of smoke likely to be produced from a fire in a small shop in 
a covered shopping mall is so great as to put at risk those people who 
would be in other shops facing the same mall. Alternative means of 
escape should, therefore, always be provided from these shops, 
either at different levels, or at the same level but leading to different 
and separated places of safety, notwithstanding that alternative means 
of escape may not be required in the Regulations or the Parts of the 
Code of Practice referred to in paragraph 3.5. 
Factors to be taken into account 
3.8 The nature of each occupancy, the number of occupants-both 
staIT and public, the number of people in the malls, the time allowed 
for evacuation of a compartment, an occupancy or part of an occu� 
pancy, the speed of travel on escape routes and therefore the maxi­
mum permissible tr:lyel distance, will all have a bearing on the means 
of escape to be provided within the complex. 
Escape routes after stage 3 
3.9 Subject to the proviso mentioned in paragraph 3.6 above, it will 
be reasonable for the normal means of access within the complex [0 
constitute the means of escape from the final exit of individual 




3.10 Il should be possible, once outside the occupancy, to proceed 
in diITerent directions, in case the route in onc direction has been 
alTectcd by the fire or smoke. Exceptions to this arc: 
a. where the route in question leads directly away from, and not 
parallel with, the frontage of the occupancy from which escape is 
being made; 
b. where the final exit gives directly on to an open space of at least 
60 III in its smaller dimension, which thus affords a route free of 
all hazard, such as a relatively unobstructed concourse, patio or 
plaza (provided that in the case of an enclosed concourse escape 
is possible in another direction); and 
c. where, exceptionally, no alternative route is possible and a 
'dead-end' condition exists. This will be compensated for when 
considering restrictions·on the distance to be travelled (paragraph 
3.11 below). But shops in 'dead-ends' should always have 
alternative means of escape. 
Restrictions on distance 
3.11 When persons are escaping from a final exit or exits along a 
mall) it may not be safe if they remain on that route in case they are 
overtaken by smoke or heat from the fire from which they are 
escaping. The distance along such a route for which it  will be safe ror 
them to travel will depend principally on whether the route is open 
to the air or roofed over and whether the route in question is a dead 
end or not, as described in paragraph 3.10 above. It is recommended 
that sare distances be determined as follows: 
a. where there are routes open to the- air and leading· in alternative 
directions or leading away from an.exit or giving on to an opert 
concourse as described in paragraph 3.!Oabove ...... n o  limit; 
b. where the route is open to the air but a dead end ...... maxi-
mum 25 m; 
c. where the route is as.described in a. above but is covered by a 
roof or ceiling ...... maximum.45 m; 
d. dead-end conditions should not be created in covered or roofed­
over exit routes; 
e. In open malls, 'dead ends' without alternative exits should not 
be created where the length of a mall exceeds 4 times its'width; 
f. ·criteria for determining what constitutes an open route as 
opposed to a covered one will be dealt with later. 
These distances ·are to be measured along a main "acc- ess routc·'-such 








occupancy, and are the maximum distances wbjch may lie between 
the exit from the occupancy being considered and the open air at the 
boundary of the complex or a fire-resisting self-closing door leading 
either into another escape route or into a staircase enclosure from 
which another main access route can be reached at another level, 
again without passing through any occupancy. 
Distance between exits 
3.12 It is recommended that exits from closed malls affording main 
routes of escape (ie the exits just referred to in paragraph 3.11) 
should be placed at intervals along those routes of not more than 
90 m. No restriction is necessary on the distance between exits from 
open malls. 
Exit capacity 
3.13 There should be sufficient exits of adequate width at intervals of 
90 m (see above) from every mall or walkway to permit the full 
numbers of escaping persons to leave the mall without undue delay. 
In calculating these numbers the basic figure to be considered is the 
number of persons for whom exit capacity is needed in the occu­
pancy exit doors leading on to the mall. To this figure will be added a 
figure to allow for persons who may be iD the mall already which 
should be calculated on the basis of one person to every 0·75 m'. 
3.14 Each exit door or group of exit doors leading out of the mall 
should have a capacity of the number of persons (calculated as 
above) who have been provided for in the occupancy exits lying 
within 45 m of the exit or group of exits in any direction . 
Width of malls 
3.15 Whether a mall which acts as a main escape route is open Of 
roofed over its minimum width at any point should never be less than 
the total width required in the exit doorways from the section of the 
mall concerned. If doors are placed across a mall used as a main 
escape route, their aggregate width should not be substantially less 
than that of the mall itself. 
Later stages of escape routes 
3.16 As was explained carlier, escape routes must continue, with 
adequate capacity. until the limits or the complex are reached. A 
main mall or walkway may lead straight to such a point within the 
recommended distance; ir i t  does not, it will be necessary (as men-
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tjollcd in pnragrarh 3. 1 1  above) to providc, within that distancc, an 
opening with a door leading either into a staircase cnclosure and then 
into ano ther main access route or dircctly into the lalter. Malls or 
walkways can constitute these latter rOlltes, provided they have the 
width reeolllll1ended in paragraph 3. 1 5  for main escape routes; 
addilionally the stairways and doors into and out of them should 
have sumcient width to accommodate those people escaping from 
occupancies along the malls in addition to persons normally to be 
expected in the malls themselves. If, however, a mall or walkway 
which mighl be used in the later stages by people escaping from the 
centre of a complex does not itself serve as a main escape route from 
occupancies adjacen t  to it, there need be no restriction on the distance 
to be travelled in it.  
Service roads and vehicular roadwavs 
3 . 1 7  It is desirable to avoid the use of the service roads of a complex 
as escape routes from other parts of the complex, but if this is  
necessary in any particular casc, pavements, or areas designated for 
pedestrians and segregated from the vehicle roadway, should be 
provided 10 a continuous width of not less than 2 m .  If a covered 
service road is used for escape purposes i n  this way, the provision of 
adequate ventilation is  of particular importance. (See part 7.) 
Covered and open escape routes 
3.1  8 It will sometimes be difficult to determine whether an escape 
route is  covered or open; this is necessary to determine its correct 
width, but doubt may exist where, for instance, a mall is traversed by 
a wide bridge and therefore covered for part of its length. Similarly, 
walkways at an upper level may be provided along an open mall and 
tend to produce conditions i n  it as if the mall were covered. 
3 . 1 9  A mall or walkway used for escape purposes should be regarded 
i n  plan, with the floors and/or bridges or gallery walkways above i t  
superimposed upon it. If, then, in any 90 m length of the mall belween 
exit doors, 25 % or more of the area of lhe mall is  found to be ob­
scured, the mall should be considered as a covered route. If the 
percentage is less than this figure, it may be deemed to be an open 
mall. However, if  the opening in a partly covered mall i s  a slot 
(formed for example by projecting continuous canopies) the mall may 
be considered 'open' unless i t  is  more than 50% covered. Any part of 
a mall covered by a bridge or roof for more than 1 5  m of the length of 
the mall should be treated as a covered mall. 
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Escape from places of entertainment 
3.20 In some of the larger complexes or developments i t  will be usual 
to find places of entertainment such as cinemas Of dance halls, concert 
halls or assembly halls, together with hotels and blocks of residential 
accommodation. Each onc of these should have its internal escape 
arrangements set out in  accordance with accepted principles. but i t  
should be ensured that the alternative ex.its from places of entertain­
ment (ie the final exit of those rontes which do not lead back by the 
same route as is taken to enter the premises) do not debouch into the 
same mall as that in  which the main exits are situated. Ideally, they 
could be taken to a different storey from the main exits, so that there 
will be a compartment floor between the two. 
Emergency lighting 
3.21 In parts of precincts which normally require artificial illumina- . 
tion it is essential that there should be a system of emergency lighting 
which will come into op�ration automatically in  the event of a failure 
of the normal lighting from whatever cause. The standard of emer­
gency lighting necessary will depend very much upon the individual 
circumstances . 
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4 Fire warning systems 
and public control 
General 
4.1 The provision or a suitable warning in the event or a fire is an 
essential clement in the safety of the occupants within a town centre 
development, and is closely tied to the means of escape arrangements. 
Building complexes or this type will comprise a number of separate 
compartments of varying occupancies such as shops, offices, enter­
tainment centres, residential flats etc. In an emergency the occupants 
of these different premises will discharge into open malls, concourses 
and walkways, or, in the case of the larger complexes into internal 
covered malls and walkways. 
4.2 Whcre open malls and concourses are available the problem of 
evncuation On the sounding of a fire alarm may well be similar to that 
encountered in the normal urban area where escape is into an open 
road or street. In the larger building complexes, however, malls, 
walkways and even concourses are often roofed over, extending some 
distance within the heart of the complex, and having in some cases 
other occupancies above them. 
4.3 The considerable quantities of smoke and hot gases which can be 
evolved in a fire would in all probability discharge into a mall or 
concourse. If this were an open area there would be little hazard to 
means of escape, but on the other hand a covered maIJ may rapidly 
become sufficiently obstructed by smoke and heat to render means of 
escape along it impossible. Under these circumstances it becomes 
imperative that the occupants of other premises along the covered 
mall should be forewarned that evacuation may be necessary. 
Warning systems 
4.4 It is not intended to detail the various types and methods of 
raising the alarm. This is amply dealt with, in  general, in  British 
Standard Code of Practice CP 1019:  1972 'The installation and 
servicing of electric fire alarm systems� for the majority of occu­
pancies found in a complex, and more specificalJy (in respect or 








a. British Standard Code of Practice CP 3 :  Chapter IV: Part 2 (1968) 
'Shops and Departmental Stores'. 
b. British Standard Code of Practice CP 3 :  Chapter IV :  Part 3 (1968) 
'Office Buildings'. 
c. Department of Employment Booklet 'Fire Fighting Equipment, 
Fire Alarms and Fire Drills in Omces and Shops-SHW5'. 
This guidance however, is concerned here with tbe fire warning 
systems in complexes and i t  might, therefore, be useful to outline the 
esta blished principles of the single and two-stage alarms procedure. 
4.5 The operation of a single-stage alarm is the signal for the 
complete evacuation of the premises concerned. No other decision 
is involved : all the occupants, both staff and public, are immediately 
a ware of the alarm and the staff will assist in  the evacuation without 
delay. 
4.6 Where large premises which are divded into separate sections or ' 
occupancies arc concerned, i t  may not be necessary to evacuate the 
whole of the premises on an initial alarm of fire in  one occupancy or 
section of an occupancy. The two-stage system provides for an 
evacuation signal (usually continuous) to be given immediately in 
the affected section of the premises while an alert (usually intermit­
tent) is sounded at the same time in adjoining section(s). This latter 
signal notifies the staff in those other sections that an emergency is i n  
progress in part of the premises but that an evacuation in their 
,cction is not immediately necessary. If and when the situation 
requires a general evacuation of the premises the second-stage alarm 
(signal for evacuation) is given and then both staff and public should 
leave the premises. This system may also be adapted for use in multi­
storey buildings to signal the evacuation of part of the premises, 
while sounding an alert signal throughout the rest of the building. 
Application to complexes 
4.7 For a fire warning system to be effective in a complex i t  must not 
only raise the alarm within the occupancy in which the fire occurs, 
but also, alert at the same time other occupancies at risk and indicate 
that an emergency has arisen. Such a signal would also imply that 
evacuation may follow should the situation deteriorate. The question 
of whether to evacuate other occupancies or not depends very much 
on lhe nature of the escape roules availablc. As already stated, open 
malls and concourses do not prcsent any great problem to the safe 
movemcnt ofpcop\e discharging on to them, but covered malls which 
may become affectcd by smoke and hot gases may create a hazardous 
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situation in whic.:h the occupants of adjaccnt occupancies may find 
t.heir cscapc route via the Illall unusable. 
4.S Provision for raising the alarm in complcxes can bc made under 
2 headings: 
<l. Escape on to opell malls and concourses 
Tn the smaller type of town centre development where there is 
adequate means of escape from individual premises on to open 
areas and the occupancies arc suitably compartmenled from each 
other, i t  is not considered nccessary to alert any occupancy other 
than that in which the fire occurs. 
b. Escapc on to covered malls etc. 
Where main escape routes from occupancies arc d irectly on to 
covercd malls or walkways additional fire warning facilities are 
recommended i n  the form of a two-stage system in which the alert 
signal should be given i n  ncighbouring occupancies on the opera· 
lion of the signal 10 evacuate the affccted occupancy. 'Ncigh­
bouring occupancies' should be taken to mean those which have 
exits giving on to the same mall as those oftbe affected occupancy 
and to which means of escape arc common. 
Escapes into 'dead ends' 
4.9 Where occupancies open into an open mall, and escape along 
that mall is in onc direction only, an evacuation signal should be 
given in all the occupancies opening into that mall or any connecting 
but not separated mall and sharing the same single escape route, 
on the operation of an evacuation signal i n  any of them. 
Public address systems 
4.10 The use of a public addrcss system to control and give i nstruc­
tions in  the event of an emergency is one which is particularly 
applicable to large building complexes. The discharge of large 
numbers of people from shops and offices etc on to already crowded 
malls and walkways under emergency conditions will present a 
considerable problem. The orderly movement of  these people along 
the malls away from the fire towards places of safety may be parti­
cularly difficult where the malls are roofed over. 
4.1 1  The probability of quantities of smoke issuing into the mall 
from the occupancy on fire and spreading i n  botb directions along 
the mall will, of course, affect the behaviour of people on the mall. 
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the safety of the public, but also i n  allowing the fire brigade to gain 
access along the mall to the fire. 
4.1 2  I t  is  desirable tbat there should be a form of public address 
system instaUed i n  the malls where these are roofed over. If i t  is to be 
effective i t  i s  essential that the control of this system be in  the hands 
of a responsible person who is i n  a position to give the correct 
i nstructions according to circumstances. Pre-planning may well be 
the key to the communication difficulties inherent i n  sllch a pro­
cedure, and there may be merit, for the initial stages of an incident, 
i n  the use of pre-planned, taped instructions which could be broad­
cast through the system within the affected zone on the operation of 
an evacuation signal in  any occupancy. This would depend to some 
extent on whether a comprehensive and reliable system of security 
personnel existed i n  the complex. 
4.13 In some cases there might be a need to extend the public address 
facilities to public areas in  separated buildings forming part of the 
complex. If, however, there was already communication between the 
central control point and parts of the separated buildings, there 
might be no need for a public address system. 
Requirements under legislation 
4.14 Large building complexes may contain a wide variety of occu­
pancies, but the majority will consist of shops of all kinds, both large 
and small, and offices. These types of premises are subject to the 
provisions of the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963, 
which include the provision of effective means of giving warning in 
case of fire in  premises requiring certification. 
4.1 5 Premises within the complex which are used for public enter­
tainment, such as theatres, cinemas, dance halls etc, will be licensed 
for their use or may be subject to the provisions of the Fire Pre­
cautions Act 1971 .  Tn these cases the provision of a fire warning 
system may be included in the conditions of licence or in  the fire 
certincate. 
4. 1 6  It will be appreciated from what is said above that the recom­
mendations in this code as regards occupancies giving on to open 
malls involve no greater provision than that required by the relevant 
legislation. However, where closed malls are incorporated i n  a 
complex, the recommendations or this code of guidance cannot be 
met by relying on the legal obligations of individual occupiers. In 
these circumstances, it  is perhaps for the developer to accept the 
responsibility of providing a comprehensive system. 
23 
5 Means of calling the fire brigade 
General 
5.1 There should be adequate means in complexes for the giving of 
an alarm of fire to the fire brigade. 
5.2 Within any complex there will be private telephones from which 
calls to the emergency services can be made during normal trading 
hours. There will, however, be times during which the commercial 
scclions of a complex will be closed and calls to any fire discovered 
by a passer-by will have to be made by means of public facilities. 
Public telephone call-boxes are only provided where there is a likeli­
hood of them being viable financially and this may be unlikely within 
the confines of a complex. 
Street fire alarm systems 
5.3 Because of the problem of clearly defining a position within a 
complex, especially for a comparative stranger, it is advisable that 
any means of calling the fire brigade should be such that it will be 
possible to locate the origin of the call and also locate the position in 
which the fire is stated to have occurred. One way of achieving this is 
by some variant of the street fire alarm, with alarm points installed at 
strategic places; when these are operated, an alarm is given from a 
readily identifiable posilion. This would obviate the difficulties 
mentioned above and also that which arises in areas with many 
immigrants who have little or no knowledge of English or of means of 
describing their position. 
5.4 One complex has already been equipped with a number of heads 
which resemble those on the former police pillar box. The act of 
opening the door of the box transmits a signal which identifies the 
box on a panel in the fire station and, by means of the speech arrange­
ments, the brigade operator is able to try to get further details. 
The 'ABC' system 
5.5 Another system which uses the existing telephone network is that 




which accepts signals fro·m automatic apparatus and transmits them 
to the appropriate emergency service, is self-monitoring and is 
electronically tested every 3 seconds. The Fire Offices' Committee bas 
agreed in  principle that if tbis system is provided by tbe Post Office, it 
may be used in conjunction with automatic fire alarm equipment and 
it may therefore be taken to be acceptable for local fire alarm pur­
poses. 
5.6 One use of this system which migbt be envisaged would comprise 
a number of call-points installed throughout a complex, each one 
having a distinctive code; on the operation of a head the alarm signal 
would be routed by Post Office equipment to the fire brigade terminal 
point where the signal would operate a buzzer and a lamp and 
produce a print-out of the code number identifying the point, a serial 
number and the time of receipt of the signal. By this means, the 
brigade would be able to pin-point the exact location of the alarm 
and, by means of prior information recorded i n  the control, be able 
to determine the means of approach to the site and the risk area. 
5.7 The ABC system can also carry signals from any type of auto­
matic fire alarm system, automatic sprinkler system, or, if desired, 
any manual alarm system within a building or shop unit. fdentifica­
tion is thereby assured. 
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6 First-aid fire-fighting equipment 
General 
6. 1 The provision of suitable fire-fighting appliances for use by the 
occupants of a building complex is dealt with under 2 main headings: 
n .  within occupancies; and 
b. in malls, walkways Hnd other public thoroughfares. 
Within occupancies 
6.2 Most of the occupancies normally found within a complex fall 
within the bounds of the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 
1963, and will therefore be required to have 'appropriate means for 
fighting fire'. 
6.3 Other occupancies such as theatres, cinemas and similar places of 
entertainment will be covered by conditions of licence which 
generally include requirements regarding fire-fighting equipment, Of 
they may be specified in a fire certificate issued for any premises to 
which the Fire Precautions Act 1971 applies. 
I n malls and public thoroughfares 
6.4 It is considered unnecessary and i ndeed inadvisable to provide, 
for the use of the public, lire-fighting equipment in  malls and other 
public areas. However, in circumstances where a complex is manned 
and patrolled by a full-time, trained security force i t  may be advan­
tageous for equipment such as hose reels to be provided at strategic 
points throughout the complex. Such equipment would be for the 
use of the security personnel before the arrival of the fire brigade. 
6.5 It should be pointed out that where equipment of this kind is 
provided in the public parts of a complex careful supervision aud 
maintenance will be necessary to prevent misuse and vandalism. It is 
essential that any fire-fighting apparatus be always in good working 







Scale and type of equipment 
6.6 This code of guidance does not contain any detailed recom­
mendations regarding the number or type of fire appliances required 
within occupancies i n  a complex. The decision as to the require­
ments of each individual occupancy must depend on such factors as 
size, layout, corn bustibility of contents, abnormal fire risks and so on. 
6.7 There arc a number of publications to which reference should 
be made for guidance:  
a.  British Standard Code of Practice CP 3 :  Chapter IV: Part ? 
(1968) 'Shops and Departmental Stores'. 
b. British Standard Code of Practice CP 3 :  Chapter IV: Part 3 
(1 968) 'Office Buildings'. 
c. British Standard Code of Practice ep 402: Part 3 :  'Fire Fighting 
Installations and Equipment : Part 3 :  Portable fire extinguishers 
for Buildings and Plant'. 
' 
d.  Department of Employment Booklet-SHW5 'Fire-fighting 
equipment, fire alarms and fire drills in  Offices and Shops' . 
e. 'Guides to the Fire Precautions Act 1971-No. I Hotels and 
Boarding Houses'. 
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7 The control of smoke and heat 
Introduction 
7.1 There call be little doubt that in any fire occurring within a 
complex there will be danger that smoke and heat will affect the 
vicinity of the fire rapidly and on a large scale. Experiments bave 
been made by the Fire Research Station into the possible spread of 
smoke from a fire in a small open [ronted shop along a 6 m wide, 
3 m high mall. With a relatively small fire, such as might exist within 
the first few minutes from its inception, exits up to 70 m from the 
fire in both directions could be difficult to use because of smoke in 
2i minutes. Should the fire flash over in the shop the mall could be 
heavily smoke logged for 200 m in both directions in 2t minutes from 
the time of flash-over. 
7.2 This rapid spread of smoke can lead to 3 problems. Firstly, the 
spread of smoke and hot gases (which may be deficient in oxygen and 
contain toxic combustion products) can hinder escape and endanger 
the lives of occupants of the building. Secondly, these smoky gases 
can restrict and even prevent effective fire fighting by the fire brigade. 
Thirdly, the temperature of the hot gases may be so high as to assist 
the spread of fire. These problems arise with fires in  many situations 
but are accentuated by the size and complexity of many town centre 
developments. It is for this reason that the code recommends the 
provision of alternative means of escape, where this can be provided 
on different levels of the complex and leading to separated areas. 
However, there will be enclosed spaces in  the interior of the complex, 
far from the outside air, whence the only routes for smoke and hot 
gases may be through corridors, covered access roads, malls and 
staircases constituting the routes for aceess of people and goods. 
Day-to-day ventilation may be by forced draught systems which are 
inadequate to exhaust the large volumes of hot smoky gases produced 
by a fire. Without special provisions incorporated in  the design such 
systems might spread these products of combustion to other parts of 
the complex. 
7.3 It is true that this code makes recommendations for structural 












lised within those boundaries: however, these boundaries will not, at 
the time when the occupants are making their escape, be a positive 
barrier to the travel of smoke and heat. It will be evident that the 
damage, and obstruction to fire fighting, may well reach an extent 
considerably greater than the extent of tbe fire itself. For these 
reasons, features should be incorporated i n  the design of a complex 
whereby smoke and heat from a fire can either be localised or safely 
released to the open air. 
7.4 Current designs of complexes approach this problem in  a variety 
of ways ; some attempt is made in  all of them to provide a means of 
releasing smoke into the open air. It is common, for instance, to see 
some provision of fire venting i n  shopping malls; this must be 
accepted as particularly important, since in  many cases there will be 
no shop fronts, and members of the public i n  the shopping malls will 
in  reality be i n  onc common area which includes many shops, most 
of which have a relatively high fire load. Some notes will be provided 
in later paragraphs describing various methods being adopted or 
considered at the present time for treating this problem, but as with 
all ventilation systems which depend upon creating a movement of 
air by natural means, much depends on the random effects of wind 
turbulence and the profiles of buildings, and this is an area in which 
there is little information available at the present time. 
7.5 In the storage areas used by shops, the difficulties of fire venting 
below upper deck level have appeared to be insoluble in terms of the 
methods suitable at the upper levels. Most designs resort to the 
provision of exhaust vents in the form of vertical ducts, and i n  these 
cases there is even more uncertainty as to whether they will be 
effective in moving the very large quantities of smoke and hot gases 
which may be evolved. 
7.6 This is an unsatisfactory situation, which arises from lhe basic 
fact that a big proportion of most redevelopment complexes are 
akin to basement designs. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
some serious fire fighting and possibly rescue problems arc awaiting 
the fire service when more and more complexes arc completed and 
brought into use. The main difficulty is that because of the un­
predictability of wind effects, methods of estimating the efficiency 
of smoke venting from the lower levels of buildings have not yet 
been fully developed. This being so, it is difficult to point with suffi­
cient urgency to the need for taking action to provide a cure, and it is 
cqually difficult to balance the cost of taking such action against the 
risk of damage. These are areas of uncertainty. 
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Methods available 
7.7 The following paragraphs contain brief notes of mClhocls which 
have been considered for removing smoke and heal and l imiting t heir 
I ravel within buildings. COllsideration is given to tileir applicability 
10 complexes together with an indication of the required capaci ties of 
the systems. There arc considerable practical difficulties inherent i n  
1110st of them and it  must be emphasised that there is urgent need for 
final solutions to be developed, evaluated and put into practice as 
50011 as possible. 
7.8 An important consideration when determining the scale on which 
to provide fire ycn1ilation in any builcl ing is the size of the fire that is  
to be assumed. If sprinklers arc filled and in operation, i t  is  reason­
able to aSSllllle that the fire will grow no larger than perhaps 3 m by 
3 ll1. However, i t  would be a departure from accepted practice to 
prcsuppose that provision for means of escape in a complex could be 
based on sprinklers confining a fire: this would be unjustified if for 
no other reason than that not all enforcing authorities for means of 
escape arc authorised to impose requirements for the maintenance of 
sprinkler systems. If such a system did fail to operate for any reason 
the whole basis of the means of escape provision would be under­
mined. 1 n  the following paragraphs, therefore, the assumption is not 
made that the fire will be controlled to any specific dimensions 
through the provision of sprinklers. 
7.9 I t  is  important to note that many of the ways which could be 
employed to exhaust smoke and hot gases can themselves give rise to 
exposure hazards. Tt is  an axiom that the process of exhausting 
smoke and heat from a building only transfers it  from one place to 
another, and is frequently capable of creating a fire risk at the point 
where i t  is discharged. This should be borne i n  m ind i n  every 
instance where steps are taken for the removal of smoke and heat. 
7.10 Because of the possible rapid spread of smoke and hot gases, 
systems designed to provide ventilation to facilitate escape must 
operate at an early stage i n  the fire, at least as soon as the first 
sprinklers open. They should be automatic and smoke detectors are 
the preferred means of initiation. Many fire brigades may prefer that 
systems designed to provide ventilation to facilitate fire fighting 
should be under their control. This may be important with natural 
ventilation systems, which are subject to wind effects, but it must be 
remembered that it  i s  easier to prevent a space becoming smoke 
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Limiting spread of smoke 
7.1 1  One method of confining smoke and hot gases i s  by limiting 
their spread t o  a single room even though this room will become 
smoke logged. I n  theory i t  i s  possible to prevent smoke and bot 
gases flowing out of tbe room through doors and other openings by 
providing a pressure of air outside the room greater than the natural 
pressure of the hot gases trying to flow out. This may be achieved 
either by extracting hot gases from the room o r  by creating a higher , 
air pressure outside the room (this latter is  the principle employed in 
the 'pressurisation' of escape routes). In either case, unless the room 
has direct openings to outside, ducts must be provided to carry 
away the hot smoky gases; fresh air to replace them will be drawn in 
via escape routes. In practice the size of fan and associated ducts 
required will be unacceptably large unless the area of openings into 
the room is very limited, and this generally means that self-closing 
fire doors to the room or shop must be provided and closed. :More­
over, i f  fans are to be used o n  the extract side of such a system, they 
will have to handle the products of combustion and thus must be 
capable of withstanding the effects of high temperatures. This i s  
l ikely greatly t o  increase the cost of a n  installation. 
Removal by natural ventilation 
7 . 1 2  There is  considerable experience in the use of natural ventilation 
through roof vents to confine hot gases and smoke to a layer beneath 
the ceiling, with clear air near the floor, if a fire occurs in a large single 
storey building. This method may be used in the upper floors of 
complexes, (or lower floors if shafts arc used to convey the hot gases 
through the upper floors). The principle is that, in the absence of 
disturbance, smoke and hot gases will initially form a stratified layer 
beneath the ceiling, the air beneath being relatively clear. Ventilation 
systems should be designed to draw off these hot gases at a high level 
while disturbing the stratification as lilt!e as possible. This generally 
entails a number of small outlets rather than one large onc and the 
avoidance of high velocities in both inlets and outlets. A n  equal 
volume of air is required to flow into the building to replace the 
smoke and hot gases. This must enter the compartment at a low level 
beneath the layer of hot smoky gases. 
Miscellaneous points 
7. 1 3  Several points which scarcely arise with single storey buildings 
assume considerable imparlance in complexes. Firsliy the effects of 
wind both on vents and fresh air inlets must be considered. The 
3 1  
presencc of lallcr paris of thc complcx adjaccnt to vcnt outlcls may 
result ill down draughts in unfavourable wind conditions. These 
dimcullics may be overcome in certain circumstances by the use of 
chimncys abovc thc roof level or by aerodynamic design of vcnt 
outlcls so that thc wind produccs a suction effcct. Sccondly the 
position of vcnts and shafts will frcquently bc dictated by the layout 
of highcr levels of the complex. This may mcan that they are remote 
from the situation where fires may occur so that the gases may have 
cooled before reaching the vents. An  increase in area is  required to 
compensatc for this. Thirdly shafts should be provided with a degrec 
of insulation which will ensure that the temperature of the shaft is 
maintained at least as high as that of the space being vented or there 
may be some difficulty in establishing an up-draught with a small but 
smoky firc. 
7.14 In the light of the foregoing, 2 main alternatives present them­
sclves as solutions to the problem : confining the smoke to the shop of 
origin so as to prevent i t  affecting the pedestrian mall on a large scale ; 
and removing the smoke from the mall on the assumption that the 
former method is impracticable. In both methods the 2 alternatives of 
powered extract fans and natural ventilation must also be considered. 
7. 1 5  It is important that any forced draught system, and any natural 
ventilation system in so far as it is controllable, should be capable of 
being controlled by the fire service as soon as i t  is ready to begin fire­
fighting operations. This should be achieved by suitably positioning 
and identifying switches and dampers. 
Confinement of smoke to shop of origin 
7.16 One effective way of preventing a shopping mall becoming 
smoke logged is to confine the smoke and hot gases to within the shop 
on fire. If the shop were fitted with self-closing fire doors the prin­
ciples of paragraph 7. 1 1  would apply and a relatively small powered 
extract system would suffice to ensure that smoke and hot gases did 
not pcnetrate to the mall. However, the practice of designing shops 
without shop fronts has become so prevalent and widespread that the 
existence of a shop front cannot always be assumed, and this would 
put a powered extract system beyond the bounds of practicability. 
It may, however, be practicable to use natural roof ventilation in, for 
instance, a single storey development or the top floor of a multi­




















7.17 In shops fronting on to a covered mall it should be possible to 
assume tbat a fire would, in the early stages at least, involve only a 
part of the floor area of the shop. The fiow of hot gases into the mall 
at high level could i n  theory be prevented by a fascia combined with 
adequate ventilation and i t  is  immaterial whether the shop is other­
wise open fronted. The minimum required depth of fascia may 
tentatively be given as 1 m. If the fire is taken as having an area of 
3 m X 3 m (and thus a perimeter of 12  m) and the ceiling height as 
3·8 m the required ventilation rate may be calculated (on present 
evidence) as being 28·3 m'!sec. This represents 5 air changes per 
hour in  a shop with a floor area of 4 645 m2. The number of air 
changes required per hour would be larger if tbe fire became larger, 
or if it were of the same size in a smaller shop, and the size of extract 
system required for even a small fire would be practicable only in the 
largest shops. 
7. 1 8  Natural ventilation for a fire with the same or a larger perimeter 
would require at least 10  m2 of vents. Trthe outlets were some distance 
above ceiling level (ie via shafts) a lesser area of vents would suffice. 
With natural ventilation the space beneath the ceiling of a large shop 
should ideally be divided by screens of the same depth as the fascia 
into 'compartments' of preferably 930 m2 maximum area, each 
containing sufficient ventilators to exhaust the hot gases from the 
'design' fire. For each 12  m of perimeter of a fire I per cent of floor 
area is required ; if the ceiling cannot be sub-divided the vent area 
should be increased. 
7. 19  It will be seen from the above that in practice the prospects of 
successfully confining smoke and hot gases to the shop of origin arc 
not favourable. Better possibilities may be offered by the attempt to 
remove the smoke and heat from the mail, assuming that it will 
unavoidably find its way there. 
Removal of smoke and heat from shopping-malls 
7.20 The presence of a layer of smoke and hot gases beneath the 
ceiling will inevitably cause apprehension to the occupants of the 
shopping centre even though the air below is clear. To minimise this 
apprehension and prevent the possibility of panic the bottom of the 
layer of hot smoky gases should be as high as possible above people's 
heads. There is probably a minimum depth for the layer of gases and 
this may be as much as onc third of the ceiling height;  certainly it  is 
unlikely to be less than I m. If the shop or mall is 4 m high this means 
that the bottom of the layer of hot smoky gases will be only about 
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2·7 m from the floor. This is the absolute minimum height necessary 
with no factor of safety. Thus generally the ceiling should be mueh 
higher than 4 m. It is tentativcJy suggested that the smoke reservoir 
should be at least I m deep and preferably should have a depth equal 
to one third of the height of the ceiling above the floor. 
7.21 The length of mall over which this layer extends should be 
restricted as far as possible by screens extending at least I m from the 
ceiling, at intervals tentatively suggested as not exceeding 60 m. This 
length of mall should be provided with sufficient ventilation to 
remove the smoke and hot gases produced by a fire in a shop. The 
area of natural venting required in the mall wiJI be greater than in 
the shop on fire beca.use the vents wiJI be further from the fire and the 
gases passing through cooler; however, an aggregate cross sectional 
area of vents equal to 3 per cent of the floor areas of the mall, in the 
case of a 3·8 m high mall about 7·3 m wide, should be adequate for 
each 1 2  m of perimeter of fire in a small open fronted shop. (For a full 
description of automatic venting systems see Fire Note No 5 
prepared by the Joint Fire Research Organisation and published by 
HM Stationery Office.) 
7.22 When a covered mall extends through 2 or more storeys with 
walkways at upper levels it is necessary to ensure that the layer of 
smoke and hot gases is not so deep as to hinder escape from the 
upper walkways. If there is a fire on the lowest floor the gases wiJI 
mix with the air in the mall so that the volume to be evacuated is 
several times greater than that considered in paragraph 7.19 and the 
area of vents wiJI need to be correspondingly greater. 
Removal of smoke and heat from lower levels 
7.23 Most schemes, as at present designed, allow for only 2 ways 
whereby smoke can be exhausted, or can exhaust itself, froni the 
lower levels of a complex. The first of these is the possibility (and it 
may be no more) that the smoke will disperse by way of the service 
roads to open air. The second is by the provision of vertical extract 
ducts terminating in the open air. The problems of the removal of 
smoke and hot gases from lower levels are theoretically no different 
from the problems of their removal from upper levels and the 
volumes of hot gases to be discharged are the same. Practical prob­
lems arise with natural ventilation because the hot gases need to be 
ducted through the intermediate floors although the cross sectional 
















7,24 The theoretically ideal scheme for a complex would provide 
ducts of generous cross section at frequent points at all levels, 
discharging from outlets in  the open air above the higher deck leveL 
Dampers, either operated by hand or by a system of detectors, would 
be provided at the tops of the ducts, Individual ducts would be 
needed to serve different levels. Where there was no prospect of 
effective chimney action at the top of these ducts, mechanical 
ventilation would be provided as a supplement. This is at present an 
unrealistic picture: efforts of this magnitude are not made in present 
day redevelopment schemes to deal with the problem. The problem 
has not yet demonstrated itself to its full potential: it may be 
necessary, when experience has been gained of the incidence and type 
of fire to be expected in complexes, to work more vigorously along 
these lines, 
Recommendations 
7,25 1 .  When the preliminary work of the Joint Fire Researcb 
Organisation on the control of smoke and heat in complexes is 
duly taken into account, it is considered tbat tbe recommenda­
tions for means of escape in part 3 of tbe Code are still valid and 
reasonable, providing that adequate ventilation is incorporated 
as specified below, 
2. Ventilation openings with the object of releasing smoke and bot 
gases from pedestrian malls should be provided equal in total 
area to 3 per cent of the mall floor area, and this should be 
combined witb screens fitted into the ceilings of the malls as 
described in paragraph 7.21 .  The venting system should be so 
designed tbat the wind is unlikely to have an effect on its opera­
tion (see paragraph 7.\3). 
3. In any design in which ventilation openings in pedestrian malls 
afe not provided to this extent, compensatory means should exist 
for confining smoke and hot gases within the sbop of origin. This 
may be achieved by methods described in paragraph 7.16. 
4. Ventilation openings, associated with vertical extract ducts, 
should be provided from spaces in the lower levels of complexes 
to the same extent as has been recommended for pedestrian malls. 
If any such extract system is assisted by a reliable system of forced 
draught, the size of the ventilation openings may be reduced to 
provide an equivalent effect. 
5. Experimental work on the control of smoke and gases in corn· 
plexes is being pursued by the Fire Research Station, and 
designers should be prepared to modify their practices in the light 
offurtber information which the research work may bring to light. 
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8 The siting of fire stations 
8. 1  Redevelopment arcas and complexes may affect the siting of fire 
stations in onc or morc of the ways described in the following para­
graphs. 
Restricted access for vehicles 
8.2 The time taken to attend at a fire may be lengthened due to the 
impossibility, in  many cases, of reaching the scene of the fire with a 
fire-fighting vehicle. If such a vehicle can proceed only to within a 
certain distance of a fire, the crew will have to proceed the remaining 
distance on foot, either on the level or between levels using stairs or 
lifts or both: equipment will, moreover, have to be transported in the 
same way. This will apply particularly in such parts of the complex as 
extensive shopping arcas on floors above or below the level at which 
vehicle access is possible. This situation points to the conclusion that 
if attendance times are to be maintained, vehicle travel time must be 
reduced and hence that fire stations may need to be sited nearer 
development areas and complexes. 
Circulatory and linear traffic schemes 
8.3 In a large complex, lengthened attendance times may be expected 
if there is an arrangement of traffic routes involving longer travel than 
would normally be the case. Plans have been suggested for new towns 
i n  which main vehicle roads are confined to the perimeter of the 
whole development, and access to the interior by means of subsidiary 
vehicle roads would be sparse in the extreme;  a situation could be 
envisaged in which a fire appliance needed to drive 5 miles round the 
perimeter road and half a mile on the subsidiary road to reach a 
point which was, i n  fact, only three-quarters of a mile from the fir� 
station as the crow flies. Where an existing city includes � large 
development complex which has a linear development ratber than a 
radial one, i t  may be found that access for vehicles across the develop­
ment is forbidden, and any cross traffic is required to go round the 
development at one end or the other. This, may substantially in­
crease the distance between a fire station upon one side of the comw 





8.4 While schemes of this type may well alfect decisions about the 
siting of fire stations, i t  is clearly desirable that the planning of a 
complex should be undertaken with the effect on fire brigade attend­
ance times in mind. Minimal changes may then permit acceptable 
attendance times to be maintained without the need to re site fire 
stations nearer or possibly within a complex. 
• 
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9 Identification of addresses 
9. 1 Onc of Ihe problems associaled wilh complexes and redevelop· 
ment areas is the absence of the conventional form of address for any 
premises or occupancy. By conventional address is meant the name 
or number of the premises, the name of the street in which it  is  
silualed, followed by Ihe name of Ihe district or loealily. 
9.2 It is reasonable to assume that other methods of identification 
will be employed for premises in complexes and these may include 
the following: 
a. rcference to named buildings or paris of buildings together with 
the floor of the building and a number for the premises on that 
floor; 
b. reference to a zone of the complex perhaps with further letters or 
figures to signify particular premises within the zone; 
c. reference to levels within the complex; 
d .  reference to pedestrian malls or walkways; 
c. reference to access points into the complex, whether for pedes-
trians or for vehicles. 
There is unlikely to be any consistency between complexes and this 
presents obvious difficulties i n  identifying the most suitable route and 
access to an incident for fire-fighting purposes, especially where 
reinforcing moves are involved. 
9.3 There is obvious advantage if developers can be encouraged to 
use a system of nomenclature in which the address always causes 
some indication of the correct access point for emergency attend­
ances. One simple way of achieving this i n  part is by the provision 
of a public alarm system such as is referred to i n  paragraph 5.3. In 
this case, the point of origin i n  a case is automatically indicated by 
virtue of the circuitry employed and i t  is comparatively easy for the 
fire brigade to associate an access point with each calling point of the 
alarm system. If the system is zoned, so that an indication of only 
the zone i s  received when a call is  given, then attendance will be 







9.4 Unrortunately, such an arrangement will only cover eaUs put 
through from call points on the alarm system, whereas fire calls 
from premises which are occupied at the time will in  some cases be 
put through by exchange telephone. This is liable to result in a call 
being given to, for instance, 'British National Stores, "Voking New 
Town', which gives no indication of the access point to be used. 
9.5 In relation to small complexes or shopping centres i t  seems likely 
that this difficulty can be overcome within the framework oftbe card 
index systems at present used by brigades for conventional addresses, 
without the need for recommending special systems ofnornenc1ature. 
9.6 [n larger complexes the difficulty will remain. Where a security 
staff is provided and fire calls arc routed through a central control 
point in the complex (though this is not an arrangement recom­
mended in part 5 or this Code), the security staif can add to a fire 
call the requisite indication of which access point is to be used b)' 
attending appliances. Where fire calls are made direct to the fire 
brigade from individual occupancies, it seems vitally necessary to 
arrange with developers or occupiers that telephones be fitted with 
cards or notices showing how the address should be given when 
making an emergency call. The address as given should always 
include a code name, letter or figure which can be linked with an 
access points . 
9.7 Tn some cases it may be expedient to link with this the provision 
of directional signs (illuminated as necessary) at access points to 
guide appliances to the appropriate vertical access point (sce para­
graph 10.3) relating to the addresses or zones indicated by the code 
names, letters or figures referred to  in paragraph 9.6 above. 
9.8 There would be obvious advantages for the fire service and other 
emergency services if these arrangements could be uniform through­
out all complexes. Whilst this is perhaps an unobtainable ideal, fire 
authorities are recommended to try to ensure at least that uniform 
arrangements exist in all complexes within their areas. 
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10 Access fOI( fire appliances 
J 0.1 The main point in question here is the distance which may lie 
between the location of an incident and the nearest point in  the 
complex to which a conventional type of fire appliance can be driven. 
This distance may be either horizontal or vertical or a combination 
of both. 
10.2 The point to which an appliance may be driven may be on the 
perimcter of the site where access is by means of public or service 
arcas; the resuiting distance to the incident may then be mainly 
horizontal along the pedestrian ways or elevated walkways. 
10.3 In the case of those developments which cover a large area and 
which arc of multi-storey construction, access for appliances within 
the boundaries of the site may well be limited to service roadways; 
these are provided primarily for the use of vehicles delivering goods 
to points from which they can readily be taken direct to the occu­
pancies. These access roads may be at basement level but they may, 
because of road planning and varying ground levels round the 
development, be above surrounding ground level; in  tills case, access 
from the service roadway may be possible both downwards and 
upwards. Where tbis is so, i t  will be necessary for access to be 
provided for firemen to reach the upper and/or lower levels, and to 
take with them conveniently and quickly such items of equipment as 
they require for an immediate attack o n  the fire. Tlus access should 
take the form of enclosed common staircases and/or lifts, the latter 
to be fitted with the necessary controls to enable firemen to take them 
over for use in  an emergency. From the developer's point of view, if 
these means of access can be used for other purposes, eg day to day 
running of the site, means of escape requirements etc, i t  is likely that 
they will be the more readily provided. The positions for these points 
of vertical access would depend on the planning of the service road­
way in  conjunction with the layout of pedestrian ways or malls at 
the levels above or below, but such points should not be more than 















parked and not morc than 90 m apart. These appliances would norm­
ally be those comprising the first attendance; any subsequent re­
inforcing appliances or those carrying special gear would, i t  is  
expetted, be directed to a marshalling arca (associated with a control 
point) clear of the service roadway from where the)' could be ordered 
In as necessary. 
10.4 However, it  may be that the means of fire fighting on the upper 
or lower levels would include fire mains (see paragraph 1 1 . 1 ) ;  if these 
were dry and installed within the staircases or lift enclosures, the 
usual requirements of access for a pumping appliance to within 1 8  m 
of and in  sight of the inlet to the main would apply. It is  essential that 
some control should be exercised by the developers oyer the move­
ment and parking of commercial vehides on the service roads, so that 
emergency vehicles would not be obstructed should the necessity 
arise for them to gain access i n  an emergency. 
1 0.5 It must be envisaged that the necessity will arise for the provi­
sion at podium level of some piece or pieces of fire-fighting equipment 
that will require the use of a lift car with a floor area larger than the 
usual 1 ·5 m2 or with a carrying load more than the usual 544 kg. It 
will usually be possible to use a communal goods lift or one provided 
in onc of the unaffected tcnancies and from where, at the upper or 
lower level, the equipment can be manhandled along a level access 
to the incident. 
1 0.6 Where developments extend over a large arca it may be 
necessary to consider a requirement for pumping appliances and 
those appliances carrying portable ladders to be driven along pre­
determined and strengthened routes to a point near (0 an incident 
where the equipment will be close at hand. Such routes should be 
clearly indicated. 
ID.7 Consideration should also be given to whether access can be 
made available to upper levels or podium decks, by way of ramps 
where there may be access across the open or top deck to other 
structures within the complex. This suggestion may inrer that there 
is a case for the use of a smaller, lighter fire appliance capable of 
carrying light equipment and a crew to pedestrian walkways and other 
levels of a complex. Whether this would provide a solution to 
problems of access would involve a comparison of the cost of 
providing decks and ramps capable of taking the weight of a specially 
designed appliance against the cost of a conventional deck and ramp. 
It may be found that a form of construction which gives structural 
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sluhilily and the appropriate degree of' fire r<:sistalH.:c according to the 
purpose group or occupallcy classilication under the Building 
Regulations will also adequatcly support a lighter than normal firc 
applia ncc carrying t he gear necessary to fight a Illcdi urn sized fire at an 
upper or lower level. AllY addcd cost of improving the weight carry­
ing capacily 01" a slrucl ure will probably be round to be a vcry 
small proportion of the total cost of the structure. 
10.8 A rurlher point which may justiry the provision or high-level 
acccss is the need to use i t  as a vantage point i n  order to fight fires in 
other buildings within the complex , wherc these buildings d o  not 
possess the intcrnal rising mains and other features facilitating 
internal lirc fighting. This is l ikely to arise when older buildings are 
incorporated within the area of a new development. 
1 0.9 Consideration has been given to the problems ("he fire service 
would have to face i n  getting from the access point at service road 
level 10 the fi re i tselr and paragraph 10.3 above suggests the provision 
or slaircases and/or l irts at predetermined points. Tt is suggested that 
if access cannol be made available for vehicles to reach the upper 
or lower levels then goods l ifts should be available, one every 1 80 m 
i r  up to 2 1l00rs above have to be traversed or onc every 90 m i f  more 













11 Water supplies 
l l . l  Some indication has been given in part 1 0  (access for fire 
appliances) of the handicaps which may be experienced by the fire 
service i n  fighting fires in complexes. These include the time taken in 
reaching the fire after leaving tbeir appliances and tbe difficulty of 
co�ordination of effort when appliances are remote from the fire­
ground. It is essential tbat tbese handicaps should not be increased 
by any failure to provide adequate quantities of water at suitable and 
easily accessible positions. 
1 1 .2 The needs of the situation can be expressed quite simply as 
follows: 
a. It must be possible to get sufficient branches to work to cover any 
reasonable eventuality. 
b. Eacb of these branches will need a foreseeable amount of water. 
c. Branches must be supplied from a point which is not at such a 
distance from the branch itself as to be operationally unaccept­
able. 
d.  Branches are ineffective if the water does not reach them at 
sufficient pressure to provide good jets, having regard among 
other factors to the loss of pressure due to friction in hose lines 
and to pressure lost i n  overcoming height. 
e. At no time during the course of a fire must conditions arise in 
which water supplies fail or cannot be maintained at an adequate 
level, whether by reason of the number of hydrants opened, the 
number of sprinkler heads operating or any other factor. 
The first 2 of these needs can be specified in terms of the discharge 
capacity of the mains through a specified number of hydrants opened 
at the same time; the third in tenns of the density at which hydrants 
arc provided ; the fourth in terms of the running water pressure 
available at a hydrant when that and other hydrants arc opened at 
the same time, and/or of facilities for pumps to be got to work from 
hydrants; and the fifth in terms of supplementary or alternative 
mains supplies. 
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I-Iydrants in complexes with applianco accoss to 
perimeter only 
1 1 .3 Where a deyelopment is of limited area and has vehicle access 
only to the perimeter, there should be charged hydrants at vehicle 
access level 011 the perimeter at such intervals that no hydrant is more 
than 90 III from another. The flow from hydrants should be such that, 
when 4 of them arc open at the same time, the total volume dis­
charged is not less than 4 500 litres/min. The running pressure at the 
open hydrants should be such that, when 2 adjaccnt hydrants arc 
open at the same time, each can supply a nominal �-in (9 mm) nozzle 
through onc length of hose at a (running) nozzle pressure of 5 bars. If 
the complex has a level which is more than 1 8  m above ground level 
(or appliance access leyel), any rising mains should be provided with 
inlets immcdiately adjacent to each hydrant and outlets on each level. 
If the height exceeds 60 m, this should be a charged rising main. 
(Sce paragraph 1 1 .8.) 
1 1 .4 In addition, arrangements should exist whereby the water 
undertaking can, at short notice, restore the conditions specified 
aboye in  the event of failure or shortage of supply in the mains by 
diverting supplies from an alternative main. Where the water under­
taking is unable to effect this diversion from an alternative main in 
the area, the nearest hydrant on the alternative main should be not 
more than 150 m from the perimeter of the complex at its nearest 
point. 
Hydrants in complexes with appliance access at main 
upper deck level 
1 1 .5 It is recommended in tbese instances that hydrants be proyided 
throughout the area of the main upper deck and on all other levels 
giving access to individual occupancies. No hydrant should be more 
than 90 in from another and the flow from each should be such as to 
conform with the recommendations of paragraphs 1 1 .3 and 1 1 .4 
above. 
Hydrants in  complexes with appliance access at low 
level 
11.6 In this situation it is desirable tbat cbarged hydrants as specified 
in earlier paragraphs should be provided at appliance access level, on 
al\ levels above or below this which give access to individual occu­
pancies, and on the main upper deck level. The hydrants at appliance 
access level should preferably be situated immediately adjacent to 











1 1 .7 In complexes which have not more than 2 levels above appliance 
access level, i t  is for the fire authority to determine whether i t  would 
be satisfactory to forgo the provision of charged hydrants on the 
upper levels and recommend instead a dry rising main immediately 
adjacent to each hydrant on the appliance access level. This would 
require outlets on all upper levels giving access to individual occu­
pancies and on main upper deck level. In deciding this the factors to 
be taken into account would include the layout of the complex, the 
nature of the fire and life risk at various levels and the height of 
buildings at main upper deck level. 
Tall units within or on complexes 
1 1 .8 The provision of dry or wet rising mains within tall units 
forming part of a complex should follow the recommendations of the 
appropriate Part of British Standard Code of Practice No CP 3 
Parts I ,  2 and 3. 
Testing and maintenance 
1 1 .9 The importance of hydrants and rising mains being constantly 
available and i n  perfect working order should not need to be 
emphasised. To this end, they should be regularly inspected, tested 
and maintained. It is recommended that these devices be accepted by 
the authority responsible ror the management or the complex as a 
whole. 
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1 2  Communications for 
fire service use 
12. 1  Effective communications arc vital to successful fire fighting. 
The more widespread the fire operations, the more elaborate and yet 
smooth-working the 'communications require to bc. The need for 
good communications is particularly great in complexes, when 
personal contact between fire brigade detachments and between them 
and the management of the complex is likely to be inherently 
difficult. 
12.2 A survey of the needs of the fire service in this respect wiII be 
assisted by regarding their communications requirements as faIling 
into 3 main categories, viz: 
a. Operational communications between fire service units on the 
site; 
b. Operational communications between fire service control points 
on the site and fire brigade headquarters ; 
c.  Executive communications on the site enabling the fire service to' 
obtain information from and give instructions to the manage­
ment of the complex and to the public and to supplement a. and 
b. 
For ease of reference these 3 needs wiII be referred to in  the following 
paragraphs as mobile, headquarters and fixed communications, 
respectively. 
Mobile communications 
12.3 In normal circumstances, fire brigade units on the site of a 
complex wiII use personal radio sets for communicating with each 
other and with their own control pomts, until such time as some 
fixed form of communication has been established. (This is, of 
course, only necessary when fire-fighting operations are protracted.) 
Personal radio sets, which are extremely useful as an emergency 
means of communication because of their easy portability, have 
certain disadvantages: these include occasional poor reception due 





that mobile communications should be supplemented and later 
substituted if possible by using some form of fixed communications 
as described later. 
Headquarters communications 
12.4 Similarly, the fire service would use the mobile radio stations on 
its own appliances for communicating with brigade control i n  the 
early stages. Here again, however, i t  might be undesirable to rely 
entirely o n  this means throughout a protracted operation: there may 
be local difficulty in  reception, as with personal sets, and there will 
also be difficulty and waste of time where the appliances have to be 
placed (because of limited access) remote from the seat of fire-fighting 
operations. The fire service will therefore need to place some reliance 
on the fixed communications provided in  the complex as discussed 
below . 
Fixed communications 
12.5 Various methods of communication will be provided in  every 
complex, and mention has already been made elsewhere i n  the code 
of the question of providing the means of calling the fire brigade to a 
fire. In that context the code pointed to the need, i n  the larger com­
plexes at least, for a centralised and constantly manned control room 
which would act as a co-ordinating point for many forms of fixed 
communications. In the present context, it is right to place even 
greater emphasis on the value of such a provision, which would 
enable all emergency services, the fire service included, to establish 
fixed lines of communication through such a point as a supplement to 
or in  substitution for their own pocket or portable or mobile radio 
stations. The following paragraphs contain notes on some of the 
forms of communication which might be embraced by the arrange­
ment. 
Emergency call points 
1 2.6 If these are provided in  the public paris of a complex, they 
should be equipped with telephone heads enabling firemen and other 
authorised persons to speak to the control room and/or to other call 
points. 
Direct line to fire brigade headquarters 
1 2.7 A control room, if connected by direct line to the fire brigade, 
will provide a permanent, direct speech link between fire service 
control points within the complex and the headquarters of the fire 
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brigade I h rou gho l/ I fi re· figh ling 0 pcra I ions. I r a direct I i ne is provided, 
i t  should be pos5ible to link tiny telephone extcnsion or call point via 
<I switchboard in the complex control rOOI11, to the private wire to the 
brigade control room. 
Extension telephones in occupancies 
1 2.8 There may be telephone extensions within occupancies, con· 
ncctect to a private exchange. Ir this exchange is situated, as it should 
bc, in the control room, the extension telephones will rorm an 
extrcmcly userul fixed communications link with the centre and 
through it, with other localities where control points may be set up 
by emergency services. Extension telephones could also be used for 
external contacts, eg via the private wire to the firc brigade control. 
Plug-in telephone circuits 
1 2.9 Many dcvclop�rs have made arrangements with the manage­
mcnts of buildings for the provision of built·in telephone wires, into 
which the fire service can plug its own telephone instruments and 
obtai n ' speech facilities. Thesc are normally associated with the l ifts 
providcd for thc usc of fircmen in  high buildings, or with wet or dry 
rising mains systems. Tn a complex, jf other fixed communications 
systems such as are described in  paragraphs 1 2.6 and 12.8 above, are 
not availablc, this plug-in facility could with great advantage be 
extended so that connections could be made to the control room from 
any plug-in point. Points of this kind could be provided not only at 
lifts and rising mains but at hydrants and in stairways. 
Other filted systems 
1 2. 1 0  Other features which may be provided in complexes and which 
could be of value to the fire service or other emergency services i n  a 
communications sensc, i nc1ude the following; where appropriate, 
they should also terminate i n  a control room : 
a. Public address equipment. 
b. Closed circuit television monitors. 
c.  Indicator lights l inked with fire or smoke detection systems. 
d .  Indicator lights linked with sprinkler systems. 
e. Emergency telephones for the use of authorised persons in appro­
priate parts of the complex. 
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